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1. History
By the last decade of the twentieth century, taxes as a percentage of GNP in the
advanced democracies ranged from a figure of 27 in the United States to 56 in Sweden.
These taxes are determined by voters, through competition among political parties. It
has been observed for millenia that the economic interests of citizens determine, to a
large extent, their political behavior, and for centuries, at least, that political decisions
and state policy determine aspects of the economy, including relative prices and
distribution. But it was not until the 1960s that mathematical models of the
interdependency between democratic politics and economic magnitudes were first
formulated.
My hypothesis is that value and politics, in modern democracies, are intimately
related, where by value I mean either the restricted concept of relative prices of
commodities or the broader concept of economic distribution. Economists are interested
in relative prices in so far as they tell us important things about human welfare; the main
influence of prices on welfare is through their consequences for income distribution. But
of course, in non-laissez-faire economies, distribution is not determined only by relative
prices, which is to say that the income of a citizen is not simply the sum of the monetary
values of the endowments that she chooses to sell: there are, as well, public goods and
transfer payments. So the economist must, in modern democracies, be interested in
1

Elizabeth S. and A. Varick Stout Professor of Political Science and Economics, Yale University. e-mail
address: john.roemer@yale.edu. I am grateful to John Weymark for providing me with some historical
citations of which I was unaware.

2
distribution, which is not simply a corollary to value in its restricted sense, but entails as
well the supply of public goods and bads that all consume. From this we may derive the
distribution of welfare, if individuals are endowed with utility functions that permit a
sufficient degree of interpersonal comparability2.
I said that, while the recognition that economic magnitudes influence politics is
age-old, the other direction – the influence of political decisions on economic
magnitudes-- is perhaps only centuries old. Certainly Adam Smith was well aware of
both directions. Concerning the second direction, he recognized the effects of tariffs on
domestic prices and of taxes on a variety of economic and distributive magnitudes. In
Chapter 2 of Book V of The Wealth of Nations (1994 [1784]), he recognized the
incentive effects of taxation. He opposed the tithe, in which a fraction of the product of
land was taken as tax, as discouraging the improvement of land. He noted that taxes on
wages raise wages by more than the tax, and believed that taxes on the ‘liberal
professions’ raised the salaries of those professions while taxes on government officers
did not, because the salaries of the latter were not determined by competition. He
believed that luxury goods should be taxed, but not necessaries, as taxing the latter would
raise wages and therefore the cost of production, while taxing luxury goods which are not
consumed by workers, would not do so.
I will not attempt to treat the nineteenth century economists in any detail, except
to note that David Ricardo, famously, advocated decreasing tariffs on grain in order to
keep domestic wages low, and hence keep domestic industry competitive, and Karl Marx
and Friedrich Engels believed that, were the working class were to win the vote, then
massive redistribution would take place. Francis Edgeworth (1958 [1897]) and Knut
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Wicksell (1958 [1896]) considered the problem of taxation for the financing of public
goods, but from the ethical, rather than political-economic viewpoint: that is, they took
the normative stance. It was Erik Lindahl (1958 [1919]), who, in 1919, first proposed a
political model of the determination of the level of public goods and the incidence of
their cost on the citizenry, and it is worth, I think, reviewing his model here3.
Lindahl assumed that there were two homogeneous classes of citizen, denoted A
and B. He also refers to A and B as ‘parties,’ and by this he meant political parties.
Suppose that a level of a public good, y , must be arrived at, where the level of the good
is defined by its cost of production. In addition, the cost of production must be shared
between the two parties: let x and 1-x be the shares paid by A and B respectively. Let
the total utility from consuming the public good of the group A be denoted f(y) and the
total utility of B be denoted ϕ(y) ; Lindahl assumes that f and ϕ are increasing, concave,
differentiable functions. He further assumes that the net welfare of each group is given
by the difference of their utility from consuming the good and the cost they must bear.
Thus, the utilities of the two parties at the allocation (x, y) are f (y) − xy , for A, and

ϕ(y) − (1− x)y , for B. He notes that at any share x, party A would choose its desired
level of the public good by setting its marginal utility equal to its cost share, which is just
the first-order condition for the maximization of utility:

f ′(y) = x ,

(1)

while party B would do the same, yielding:

ϕ ′(y) = 1− x.

2

(2)

Or if the ethical observer wants to apply her own interpersonally comparable measure of well-being.
The reader is referred to Silvestre (2003) for an interesting review of the Wicksell’s work including its
influence on Lindahl, and its frequent misinterpretation by modern writers.
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In Figure 1, I have graphed, the functions (1) and (2). Each of the equations (1)
and (2) determines a curve in the (y,x) plane, and these curves intersect uniquely in a
point (y*,x*). (The curve determined by (1) is denoted RA.) This is the allocation,
Lindahl says, that ‘corresponds to a situation in which both parties have equally
safeguarded the economic rights to which they are entitled under the existing property
order. This position can be called the standard position, in that it would be reached if
power were distributed evenly in relation to the existing property order.’

He also notes

that the maximal total net gain to both parties is achieved at this allocation. We can
verify this by substituting out for x in equations (1) and (2), yielding:

f ′(y) + ϕ ′(y) − 1 = 0 ,

(3)

which is indeed the first-order condition for the maximization of f (y) + ϕ(y) − y , which
is the aggregate net gain, or surplus, function.
But Lindahl does not suppose that (y*,x*) is necessarily the political equilibrium:
he says that if one party is more powerful than it is in the standard position, then it can
shift the allocation in its own favor. In fact, he proposes that the set of possible
equilibria is the left-hand envelope of the curves of in Figure 1, the curve SPR. His
reasoning was that, at any given share level x, the level of the public good would be the
minimum agreed to by the two parties.
What Lindahl appears not to have noticed is that there is a unique level of the
public good associated with all Pareto efficient allocations in his model, namely, the level
that maximizes the total surplus. This follows from the quasi-linearity of the utility
functions of the players A and B. Thus, if politics engenders efficient allocations, then
the level of the public good would be determined at that value y* that solves equation (3),
but the share variable x would be determined by political competition. Since Lindahl
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believed that equilibria could lie anywhere on the locus SPR, he therefore implicitly
thought that politics does not necessarily deliver Pareto efficient allocations. Perhaps,
however, had he been confronted with this observation, he would have revised his view
of political competition.
It is clear, from what I have described, that Lindahl viewed the political decision
as a bargaining problem between the two parties. From the political-economy viewpoint,
this was an advance over the Wicksellian ethical approach, even if Lindahl did not have a
theory of bargaining well worked out. Indeed, we might ask, what is the Nash bargaining
solution to Lindahl’s problem. It is, of course, to produce the efficient level of the public
good, y*, and the cost share variable turns out to be:
x=

1 f (y*) − ϕ(y*)
+
.
2
y*

(4)

In particular, this is not the Lindahl cost-share x*, in general. The party pays the larger
share who values the public good more, not whose marginal utility from the public good
is greater, as in the Lindahl solution. To put it another way, at the Nash bargaining
solution, given their cost-shares, each party would like a different level of the public good
from y*, so there is compromise on both sides.
The Lindahl solution for economies with public goods (see, for instance, Roberts
(1974)) has come to be known as the generalization of Lindahl’s equations (1) and (2),
namely, a set of individualized prices that citizens pay for public goods at which they
unanimously desire the same levels of those goods. As I have shown, such a set of prices
does not coincide even in Lindahl’s own very simple case with the outcome of the most
common bargaining solution to the problem, the Nash bargain. An alternative focal
point, from which Lindahl could have been generalized, was his methodologically
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innovative assumption that political competition determines the value of public goods
and the incidence of their cost on the citizenry: that would have led in the direction of
bargaining theory.
The path-breaking paper, which was to lead to the first positive theory of political
competition was Harold Hotelling’s “Stability in competition” (1929). It is well-known
that the paper studies the optimal positioning of firms on a unidimensional space.
Hotelling spent only one paragraph of the paper on its political corollary, in which he
wrote:
So general is this tendency [ to locate at the median] that it appears in the
most diverse fields of competitive activity, even quite apart from what is called
economic life. In politics it is strikingly exemplified. The competition for votes
between the Republican and Democratic parties does not lead to a clear drawing
of issues, an adoption of two strongly contrasted positions between which the
voter may choose. Instead, each party strives to make its platform as much like
the other’s as possible. Any radical departure would lose many votes, even
though it might lead to stronger commendation of the party by some who vote for
it anyhow. (Hotelling, 1929, p. 55)

The next model of which I am aware that discussed the political determination of
an economic magnitude was published in 1943, by Howard R. Bowen (1943). Bowen
studied a society in which individuals have preferences over a vector of private goods and
a single public good. He was interested in studying when a politically determined
taxation rate would deliver a Pareto efficient allocation. His argument was later
presented in modern terminology by Ted Bergstrom (1979), which I now reproduce. Let
wealths of individuals be denoted Wi, let there be a public good whose cost of production
Y is to be determined (thus determining its magnitude), and let the concave utility
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function of individual i over a single private good and public good be denoted Ui (x,Y ) .
Let ti be the share of the public good’s cost to be paid by individual i.

Define, for each i,

Yi* = argmaxU i (W i − tiY*,Y *),
Y

and let Y* = median{Yi* } . Then (t1,...,tN ,Y*) is a Bowen equilibrium.
Bowen showed that Y* was a Condorcet winner at the given tax rates. Moreover, he gave
conditions under which the Condorcet winner would be the Pareto efficient level of the
public good, at uniform tax rates ti =

1
. Bergstrom generalized Bowen’s result in his
N

1979 paper.
It is noteworthy that Bowen wrote after Hotelling and prior to Anthony Downs,
although he does not cite Hotelling’s 1929 paper.
In 1957, Anthony Downs published An Economic Theory of Democracy, which
adapted the spatial model of Hotelling (1929) to politics. The application marked the
first formal attempt at a positive model of political competition which distinguished
political parties from groups of citizens. As we have noted, in the Lindahl model, parties
are coextensive with homogeneous groups of citizens. Bowen, although he proved a
median-voter theorem, did not model competition between parties or candidates -- the
Bowen equilibrium was situated in the institution of a town meeting. For Downs, there is
an extreme divergence between parties and citizens: candidates (the political actors) are
completely opportunistic in their choice of policies, which , for them, are simply
instruments to maximize the probability of winning the election, while citizens (that is,
voters) are concerned only with policies. Indeed he wrote:
[Party members] act solely in order to obtain the income, prestige, and
power which comes from being in office. Thus politicians in our model never
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seek office as a means of carrying out particular policies; their only goal is to reap
the rewards of holding office per se. … Upon this reasoning rests the fundamental
hypothesis of our model: parties formulate policies in order to win elections,
rather than win elections to formulate policies (Downs, 1957, p.28)
Downs assumed that the policy space was unidimensional, that voters’ utility
functions were quasi-concave (single-peaked) on the policy space, and he showed that the
unique Nash equilibrium of the game between two opportunistic candidates consisted in
their each announcing the median ideal policy of the citizenry. Hotelling, of course, did
not call this a Nash equilibrium, writing, as he did, about thirty years before Nash, and
neither did Downs recognize it as such.

Indeed, the equilibrium is dominant- strategy

Nash, so it does not employ the full subtlety of the Nash concept.
The ‘economics’ in Downs was implicit, and limited to the direction ‘ economics
influences politics’, for presumably, the utility functions over policies of the citizenry
could be derived from their direct utility functions over commodities and public goods.
Downs, however, did not apply the model explicitly to economies. As a model of
politics, it constituted an extreme divergence from Lindahl, in that the parties – or
candidates—represented no citizen. Certainly the idea that political parties in
democracies had elements of opportunism had a long history, going back at least to
Roberto Michels (1915); but the choice to model them as caring only about winning
office was a radical one. Moreover, it cannot be said that this view of politics was in any
sense prevalent at the time that Downs wrote, for almost at the same time, Seymour
Martin Lipset (1994 [1960] ) published Political Man, a non-formal treatise on the
history of democratic parties, in which he argued that parties represent economic classes,
and Carl Schorske (1955) had published, only a few years before, his influential history
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of the German Social Democratic Party, in which he showed the important influence of
workers’ interests on party policy. Downs’s model of politics seems to have come not
from the political history or the political science of the time, but rather from a view that
rational agents maximize their interests, and the interest of a candidate should be taken to
be the winning of office.
It must be said, in Downs’s defense, that the principal-agent model had not yet
been formulated, and that would have provided the intermediate step between Lindahl
and Downs, namely, the model of a party that acted as an imperfect agent for its
collective constituency, an interest group or, more generally, a coalition, of the citizenry.
Certainly after Bowen and Downs, the idea of applying the median voter theorem
to the determination of economic magnitudes was in the air. In 1966, James Barr and
Otto Davis published an article in which they determined a uniform tax rate on property
as the ideal tax rate of the median voter, in an explicitly Downsian model with two
opportunistic candidates. In the same year, another formal paper was published by Davis
and Melvin Hinich on political determination of tax rates.
It is perhaps worth noting the influential paper of Robert Goodwin (1967), which
adapted the predator-prey model from biology to growth theory. Goodwin hypothesizes
two classes, workers and capitalists: the workers determine the share of wages in total
output, and the capitalists determine the share of profits that are invested, or equivalently,
the share of labor that is employed in the next period. The model is concerned not with
the level of a public good, but rather with distribution, but the two-party feature is similar
to Lindahl. Goodwin’s model is formulated as a dynamic game, and leads to cycles in
unemployment and the wage share. Goodwin’s model is, in an important sense, not a
model of democracy, however. For note that, each ‘party’ proposes only one dimension
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of ‘policy’: the workers propose an income share, and the capitalists propose how much
to invest. One important aspect of democratic competition will be that both (or all)
parties propose a value for every relevant policy variable.
In the twenty-five years from 1945 to 1970, the other key developments in
economics that are related to our story were the coming-to-fruition of the Walrasian
model, in the work of Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu (1954 ) and of Lionel
McKenzie(1954), the development of optimal tax theory, in the work of Mirrlees (1971),
and the founding work of public-choice theory by Buchanan and Tullock (1962). The
general equilibrium model was notable for its formal precision and its non-inclusion of
public good and of politics, optimal taxation theory was notable for its formal precision
and its normative rather than positive focus, and Buchanan and Tullock’s The Calculus
of Consent was notable for its positive rather than normative approach. The synthesis of
formal methodology, public goods, and a positive approach to taxation was yet to be
achieved.
I did not mention the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and the advent of social
choice theory, because Arrow’s environment was neither explicitly economic, nor was
his exploration a positive one, although it was formal. The Arrow theorem postulated an
abstract environment of social alternatives, and proceeded to show that certain
normatively desirable properties could not simultaneously hold for any social decision
procedure. Thus, although it was said, in some quarters, to provoke a pessimistic view
about the possibility of a normatively desirable democracy, Arrow’s work was twice
removed from political economy, rather than once removed, as were Mirrlees and
Buchanan and Tullock.
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Of course, a theory of political-economic equilibrium will provide an explanation
of how a polity chooses a social alternative from among a set of alternatives, and in that
sense, political economy is a specie of social choice. My concerns here are, however, in
the nature of the interaction between politics and economics, and those concerns do not
appear at the abstract level of Arrow’s theorem.
It was not until the early 1970s that formal political-economic analysis took off.
Ted Bergstrom and R. Goodman (1973) applied Downs’s model to determine the rate of
taxation to fund a public good, and Thomas Romer (1975) and Kevin Roberts (1977)
applied the median-voter theorem to determine redistributive policy.
The equilibrium concept in Bergstrom and Goodman is incomplete, in that it assumes
exogenously given tax rates which are personalized across citizens; these tax rates
determine preferences over the level of a public good, which are single-peaked, and it is
stated that the median-income citizen determines the level of the public good. The
method of the Romer paper was in brief the following. Each citizen is presumed to have
a utility function over goods, which induces an indirect utility function over a
unidimensional space of tax policies, given the mapping of tax policies into distributions
of commodities. This mapping is derived from computing the economic equilibrium that
would attain at any given tax rate. Under the right conditions, citizens’ indirect utility
functions are single-peaked (i.e., quasi-concave), and hence a Downs political
equilibrium exists.
At about the same time, Donald Wittman(1973, 1983) proposed an alternative
model to Downs’s of equilibrium in party competition, in which parties are not
opportunistic, but maximize a utility function defined on a policy space. This marked
the first model since Lindahl in which parties could potentially represent constituents, in
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the sense of maximizing a preference order on policies. I say ‘potentially’ because
Wittman did not, in fact, make the representation aspect specific: he simply assumed that
parties had exogenously given utility functions on the policy space. To be precise, parties
in his model maximize expected utility, because there is uncertainty concerning which
party will win the election, at a given pair of policy proposals.
Wittman’s parties are not opportunistic, because they do not care about winning
elections per se, but only about policy. Thus a Wittmanesque party with an ideal policy
of t would be perfectly satisfied if the opposition were elected and implemented t.
Wittman’s analysis, however, was incomplete in several ways: as I said, it did not link up
the preferences of parties to citizens’ preferences, and it did not contain a satisfactory
proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium in the model. Nevertheless, Wittman’s model
was the only formal alternative to Downs’s for twenty years or so, and in the 1990s
would come to play a role in political economy. It should be said that Wittman’s model
used the full power of the Nash concept: in general Wittman equilibria are Nash
equilibria, but are not dominant strategy equilibria.

2. The present
This brings us to what I shall call the present period, which we may take to
commence in 1990. There has been a veritable explosion in formal models of political
competition. I will now shift from the historical mode, and present a general model of
political-economic equilibrium for a democracy with an economy constituted by the
private-ownership of firms and commodities.

My purpose is to highlight what I

consider to be important issues for our research agenda.
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It goes without saying that I focus on only one question in political economy, how
economic and political equilibrium connect with each other in a general equilibrium
model. Formal political economy today studies many other issues. As I have tried to
show, this question has a long historical pedigree, and is far from being solved in a
satisfactorily general way.
I will not try to be as general as possible, but will introduce two generalizations of
the traditional economic model that will be useful in what is to follow. First, we assume
that individuals have preferences over a domain consisting of goods, private and public,
and principles. A principle is an issue on which the elected government takes a
position, an issue citizens care about, but not necessarily for economic reasons.
Principles can include, for example, issues of personal rights, environmental and ethical
concerns, and religious views. A vector of goods will be represented by x and a vector
of principles by y, where the components of y are the positions of the government on the
various principles, which may or may not be measured by a continuous variable. We
suppose there are m goods and n principles. Secondly, we assume that individuals’
preferences are represented by particular utility functions, which have some
measurability properties that permit aggregation. (Cardinal unit comparability will be
enough in what follows.) Otherwise, the economy is standard: individuals have
endowments of private goods, including ownership shares in firms, and firms have
technologies which produce private and public goods from inputs owned by individual
citizens.
A type of individual is a utility function and an endowment of goods; thus
m
n
type w is specified by a utility function u(⋅;w):R+ × R → R and an endowment of

goods ω ∈Rm+ . (Here, we assume that the levels of principles can take on any real
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number.) Types are drawn from a sample space W, and the population is specified by a
probability measure F on W.
There is a policy space denoted T= T × Rn , where T is a space of vectors of
‘economic policies’ such as tax rates, regulations on firms, transfer payments, budgets for
the production of public goods, and so on. A policy (t, y) ∈T × Rn consists of a vector of
economic policies and a vector specifying positions on principles. We will also denote a
policy by τ.
At a policy τ=(t,y) which is implemented, every citizen must ‘consume’ y . That
is, the citizen lives in a society in which the principles y are publicly expressed and/or
implemented. For example, a principle could specify a law on abortion, or establish an
official state church. Note that once principles y are given, the utility functions induce
utility functions on goods alone. We are then in a standard economic environment.
An economic equilibrium at a policy (t,y) is a set of prices p for private goods, a
distribution of private goods to citizens and a vector of public goods such that, when
citizens maximize their utilities given the principles y, the prices p, the rules engendered
by t, and the vector of public goods, all markets clear, including the markets for public
goods, whose demands by the government are specified in the vector t.
We now assume that there is a non-empty set of policies, denoted Γ, whose
elements are each associated with a unique economic equilibrium. Call Γ the set of
admissible policies. We denote the mapping from Γ into the space of economic
equilibria by E; it associates a policy τ with an equilibrium (p,x) where p is a price vector,
and x is a distribution of private and public goods. The mapping E summarizes the
direction ‘policy determines economics (or value)’, or more precisely, political variables
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determine prices and distribution. We call E an economy, for it specifies how policies
induce a distribution of goods and welfare.
We next model the other direction, how economics determines policies. Here, I
will deliberately be much less general than one could be, for I wish to model, more
specifically, democratic politics in which parties, which represent coalitions of citizens,
compete with each other over policies.
The datum with which we begin is a profile of utility functions defined on the
policy space, one for each type: thus, a function v:T× W → R , where v(t, y;w) is the
utility that type w enjoys at the policy (t,y). I shall restrict myself, for the sake of
avoiding gratuitous generality, to the case of political equilibrium with two parties.

Let

the set of reflexive, transitive, binary relations on T × T be denoted P and let the generic
element of P be denoted Π. (In the standard case, Π induces a payoff function, which we
also denote by Π: T × T→ R. But in general, Π may not induce a function on T × T.)
Each of our two parties will be identified with a binary relation Π. A party system at v is
(1) a partition of W into two elements, which we write W = L ∪ R , and (2) a mapping σ
from the set of two-element partitions of W into P × P . Thus a party system is a division
of the population into two parties, where each party possesses a payoff function (more
generally, a binary relation which may not be complete) on T × T. The mapping σ tells
us how the membership of parties induces party preferences on policies, so it models the
process of parties representing citizens.
We can now specify a game played by the two parties, where the common
strategy space for both of them is the policy space T. Denote the binary relations of the
parties associated with a partition (L,R) , Π L and ΠR , and the strict preference orders by

16
Π̂ L and Π̂ R .

A Nash equilibrium of the game (ΠL ,ΠR ,T) is a pair of policies (τ L ,τ R )

such that:
there is no τ ∈T such that (τ , τ R )Π̂ L (τ L , τ R ), and
there is no τ ∈T such that (τ L , τ )Π̂ R (τ L , τ R )

.

We call (τ L ,τ R ) a Nash equilibrium of the party system (L,R,σ).
Finally we define a political equilibrium with endogenous parties at (v,σ) as a
party system (L,R, σ), and a Nash equilibrium for the party system (τ L ,τ R ) such that :
for all w ∈L, v(τ ,w) ≥ v(τ ,w) , and
L

R

for all w ∈R, v(τ R ,w) ≥ v(τ L ,w) .
In words, each party member weakly prefers the policy put forth by his own party in
equilibrium to the policy put forth by the other party.
The concept of political equilibrium with endogenous parties models how the
preferences of citizens induce two parties, which represent citizens, and which compete
to propose policies. The party system is stable when it is the case that party members
indeed are happy with their own party’s policy proposal in equilibrium, in the sense that
4

every citizen prefers her party’s proposal to the opposing party’s proposal .
We have, finally, to connect up the two halves of the political economy. Thus
far, we have described how policies determine distribution and how political preferences
determine equilibrium policies. How do these two halves mesh?
The key is to use the mapping E to define the ‘political’ preferences v from the
direct utility functions u. Thus, for each policy τ in Γ there is an economic equilibrium,

4

If this were not the case, we imagine that the member in question would ‘vote with his feet’ and switch to
the other party.
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E(τ). Let w(E(τ)) be the vector of private and public goods and principles consumed by
type w at this equilibrium, and define:
v(τ,w) = u(w(E(τ)),w) .

(4)

In other words, we now say that citizens’ preferences over policies are determined by
their direct utility functions evaluated at the allocation of economic goods and principles
that the policies induce through the process of economic equilibrium.
We are now prepared to define a full political- economic equilibrium . The data
are:
(a) a set of goods and principles, a set of types W, each defined by a utility
function u on the domain of goods and principles, and an endowment of goods;
(b) a distribution of types, F;
n
(c) a space of policies T = T × R

(d) a mapping σ from two-element partitions of W into pairs of binary relations on

T × T.
A political economic equilibrium given these data is :
(e) an economy E for the data (a), (b), and (c);
(f) a function v:T× W → R defined by (4);
(g) a political equilibrium (L,R,τ L ,τ R ) at (v,σ).

The primitives of the model are thus preferences over goods and principles, a
distribution of types, a space of policies, and a procedure whereby groups of citizens
aggregate their interests into parties, which are represented as preference orders on the
cross-product of policy spaces. The output of the model is an economy, a profile of

18
political preferences of the types (that is , induced preferences over the policy space), a
pair of parties representing two exhaustive and disjoint classes of types, and a pair of
policies that constitute an equilibrium in the political game between these parties.
We do not state which policy ‘wins the election’; it could be the policy preferred
by the majority of voters, or there might be some uncertainty, in which case the model
does not specify a winner, but a policy lottery. Once the winner of the election is
determined, we would standardly assume that the winning policy, call it τ*, is
implemented, which in turn determines the economic equilibrium E(τ*). Thus, we have
the full story of how economics and politics determine each other.
Although the concept of political-economic equilibrium, thus defined, may seem
complex, I think it states the minimal research program in the theory of political –
economic equilibrium. Our goal, I think, is to propose interesting examples and
applications of this model. Relatively speaking, we can say that we understand the
mapping E very well: this is what general equilibrium theory has given us. The main
challenge is to think of mappings σ which model how parties are formed, and for which
political equilibria exist.
Let us see how ‘median voter’ models can be viewed as political-economic
equilibria of this type. The typical environment has a null set of principles, and a
unidimensional space T of policies: thus T=T. An individual’s type, w, may be
specified by her real wage, that is the amount of a single consumption good she can
produce in an hour of work. Thus, there is one firm that produces one good with constant
returns to scale in one input, labor, but citizens are endowed with labor in different
amounts of efficiency units. The single policy is a tax policy, which taxes all income at
a proportional rate, t, and returns an identical lump sum transfer, b, to each citizen.
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Individuals care about consumption of the good and leisure, and facing a tax rate t and a
proposed transfer payment b, they optimize. A policy (t,b) is admissible if the labor
supplied by the optimizing agents is just enough to produce the amount of the good that,
when taxed at t, produces government revenue that just equals the total amount of
transfers that citizens must receive at the promised level b. The set of pairs (t,b) that
satisfy this condition constitute the set Γ. In fact, each t determines a transfer b(t)
through the economy, so without loss of generality, we could just represent policies by
tax rates, t.
The determination of relative prices by policies is trivial here: the real wage of a
worker of type w is always w, taking the price of the consumption good as numeraire.
This is due to the constant-returns technology. So, although different policies produce
different distributions of the good and of welfare, they do not alter relative prices of
skilled labor and the good.
For each t we have an economic equilibrium, which induces the utility function
v(t,w) , expressing the utility that type w gets at the equilibrium induced by tax rate t.

We now define a particular binary relation on T × T . At a pair of tax rates
(t1 ,t 2 ) let f (t1,t 2 ) be the fraction of the population that prefers t1 to t2 . We consider the
binary relation, Π1 , whose domain is T × T defined by:.
(t 1 ,t 2 )Π1 (t 3 ,t 4 ) ⇔ f (t 1 ,t 2 ) ≥ f (t 3 ,t 4 )
That is, a party identified with Π1 prefers to be in a situation where it and its opposition
propose t1 and t2 , respectively, than a situation in which it and its opposition propose t3
and t4 , respectively, if and only if it wins a larger fraction of the vote in the first situation
than in the second.
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Similarly, we define the binary relation Π2 in the opposite way:.
(t 1 ,t 2 )Π2 (t 3 ,t 4 ) ⇔ f (t 1 ,t 2 ) ≤ f (t 3 ,t 4 )
Thus, a party with these preferences is viewed, also, as only caring about winning large
majorities, but it is identified with playing the second policy in the ordered pair
1 2
3 4
(t ,t ) or (t ,t ).

We now define a very trivial mapping σ∗, which maps every partition of W into the
ordered pair (Π1 ,Π 2 ) . That is, regardless of how the citizenry separates itself into two
elements to form two parties, each party cares only about winning the election.
If the utility function v is single-peaked in t, as it will be if u is well-behaved, then
the median voter theorem tells us there is, for any partition (L,R) a political equilibrium
with endogenous parties at (v,σ*) at which both parties propose the ideal policy of the
median citizen, which will here be the citizen whose real wage is the median real wage.
This is, essentially, the structure of all political-economy models that invoke the
median voter theorem. From the vantage point of the concept of political-economic
equilibrium, as I have defined it, these median-voter examples are deficient in two major
respects: first, political-economic equilibrium only exists if the policy space is
unidimensional, and second, the mapping σ is non-responsive to the preferences of the
members of the parties: it is , simply, a constant mapping. (One might add a third
deficiency: that the model implies that parties always propose the same policy, which
does not appear to represent real politics.) Regarding existence, the problem is that, if
the policy space is multi-dimensional, then there is in general no Nash equilibrium for the
game between these two victory-seeking parties. Formally, this is because there is
usually no Condorcet winner in a multi-dimensional policy space. (For elaboration, see
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Roemer (2001).)

The second point is the formal consequence of adopting a conception

of party competition in which parties do not have the interests of their members at heart,
but are purely opportunistic.
There are now many researchers in the area of political economy, and very few
models actually are special cases of the definition of political-economic equilibrium that I
have given, because different writers alter this or that part of my definition. Many work
with economies in which there is asymmetric information, or model the party competition
process as consisting of two stages -- a general election, and legislative bargaining -and/or introduce more than two parties, or introduce a many-period economy to study the
interplay between growth and politics, and so on. Thus, writing the general model as I
have reflects my own views about what is of primary importance in the politicaleconomy project.

I will single out two aspects, upon which I will concentrate the rest of

my remarks.
The first is to produce a conception of political competition that supports the
existence of equilibrium when the policy space has more than one dimension. Modeling
politics as unidimensional is extremely constraining, and I would say, extremely
unrealistic, yet Nash equilibrium between opportunistic parties only exists, essentially,
when the policy space is unidimensional.

The response of most writers to this problem

has been either to substitute some other equilibrium concept than Nash’s for the game
played between parties, or to say that equilibrium fails to exist in political competition,
and the consequence is ‘cycling.’ In the latter case, attention then switches to what sorts
of political institution are invented to stop the cycle. I have found both of these
approaches to be intellectually unappealing for reasons that I describe in Roemer (2001,
Chapter 8).
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The second problem is to propose a mapping σ in which parties are responsive to
their members. This is not a goal that all researchers find compelling – clearly Anthony
Downs did not. But my view is that political parties are key institutions through which
citizens with opposing interests organize their competition with each other, and it is an
historical error to model parties as not reflecting these partisan interests in their goals.
Indeed, were parties not to represent coalitions of citizens, that would constitute the most
massive agency failure in contemporary society! ( To the contrary, some argue that
parties are created to get certain individuals elected, and the example of the Reform Party
in the US, which appears to have been formed by Ross Perot in the early 1990s for this
reason, may be a case in point. ) Nevertheless, I think for a party to be long-standing, it
must become the voice of a coalition of citizens – not a totally principled voice, perhaps,
but a voice, nonetheless.
Let me discuss, first, the second of these two problems. Clearly, Lindahl’s model
conceived of parties as representing two coalitions of citizens, but the coalitional aspect
was rather trivial, because there were only two types in his society. Wittman proposed a
model of parties that have preferences over policies that are not related to their
popularity, but he failed to connect the parties’ preferences to the preferences of voters.
The first work of which I am aware that modeled political equilibrium with endogenous
parties more or less as I have defined it is that of David Baron (1993). Baron defines a
partition of voters, each represented by a party; parties take their preferences to be the
average preferences of their members (thus, an average of the functions v(⋅,w) over the
set of w belonging to the party); there is a refinement of Nash equilibrium for the
equilibrium in the game in which parties compete; and finally, each citizen must weakly
prefer the policy proposed by her party to all other parties’ proposals, in equilibrium.

23
Baron’s model is more complex than the one I have proposed in having more than two
parties, and in having two stages -- one a general election, and the second, the formation
of a government; it is less complex in not modeling the economic side. Strictly
speaking, then, it is an elaborated version of the concept of political equilibrium I have
proposed. In particular, it proposes an interesting mapping σ and an equilibrium concept
that works -- even when the policy space is multi-dimensional, I should add.
The first model, I think, which is actually a special case of our general model is due
to Ortuño-Ortin and Roemer (1998), and is available in Roemer (2001, pp. 91-94). In
this model, citizens must decide upon the level of funding of a public good, to be
financed by a proportional tax rate. Besides the public good, there is one private
consumption good, and agents do not value leisure.

Each citizen is characterized by her

real wage, that determines the amount of the private good she can produce in one time
unit. Thus, given a tax rate, there is an induced economic equilibrium (very trivially)
with a level of the public good. This induces the function v(t,w) . The party formation
process is as in Baron, except there are just two parties. Given a partition of the citizenry
into two elements L and R , each party takes as its utility function on the policy space the
average of the utility functions of its members. There is some aggregate uncertainty in
the model, so that, given a pair of policies, there is only a probability that each party will
win. Now, as in Wittman, each party wishes to maximizes its expected utility. The
L
R
binary relations Π and Π can now be defined in a natural way. It is shown that a

partition of types exists such that, at the Nash equilibrium of the game between the
associated parties, which exists, each member of each party prefers her party’s policy to
the other party’s policy. Thus, political-economic equilibrium exists.
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Even though this model is very simple, especially in its economic part, it leads to
some interesting results that are contrary to what occurs with median-voter politics. So
replacing the Downsian mapping σ* with a party formation process that is responsive to
members leads, potentially, to quite different conclusions in political economy. For
instance, it is not generally true, with this model of politics, that increasing skewness of
the wage distribution will increase tax rates -- a standard result in the Downs model,
which is not observed in reality. (For the standard result in a Downsian model, see
Persson and Tabellini (1994). )
A somewhat more highly articulated model shows that, increasing inequality in
the distribution of wages among workers should increase tax rates, when Left parties are
in power, and should decrease them, when Right parties are in power. (See Lee and
Roemer [in press].) This kind of result is, of course, inaccessible with a Downsian
model in which parties are identical.
I finally discuss the first aspect raised above, the issue of finding a conception of
political competition which supports Nash equilibrium when the policy space is multidimensional. As I have phrased the definition of political-economic equilibrium, it is
actually a question of finding a mapping σ that generates payoff functions for the parties
for which Nash equilibrium exists, when the strategy space for each party is the policy
space. Recently I have solved this problem, by conceiving of parties as constituted of
factions who bargain with each other. There are various factional structures which
generate the same formal definition of equilibrium. Here is one. In each party, there are
two factions, called the guardians and the opportunists. The opportunists are Downsian
actors, who wish only to maximize the probability of the party’s victory. The guardians
wish to propose a policy as close as possible to the ideal policy of the average party
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member. The bargaining between factions can be thought of as follows: facing a policy
from the opposition party, the guardians in party L insist that the party not propose a
L
policy which would give the average constituent a utility below a certain number, k ;

subject to this constraint, the opportunists find the policy that maximizes the party’s
probability of victory. Bargaining takes place between the two factions over the value of
kL.
I now state the equilibrium concept formally. Given a party membership
consisting of types in the subset I of W, define the average utility of the members on
policies as:
V (τ) = ∫ v(τ,w)dF(w) .
I

I

Let the probability that policy τ1 defeats policy τ2 be denoted π(τ1 ,τ 2 ).
We define a party unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) as:
(1) a partition of the set of voter types W = L ∪ R;
(2) a pair of policies (τ L ,τ R ) and numbers k L ,k R such

τ L = arg max{π (τ , τ R ) | V L (τ ) ≥ k L }
τ

τ R = arg max{π (τ R , τ L ) | V R (τ ) ≥ k R }
τ

(3) for all w ∈J

v(τ ,w) ≥ v(τ ,w), for J = L,R ,
J

~J

where ~ J means the other element than J in the partition.

In general there is a two-dimensional manifold of such equilibria, corresponding to
choices of the ordered pair (k L ,k R ) . We can view these constants as reflecting the
relative power of the intra-party factions in internal bargaining over the platform.
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The important fact is that, for a wide variety of economic specifications, there
exist political-economic equilibria, even with policy spaces of high dimension. Thus,
complexifying the concept of what a party is, by modeling its internal factional structure,
provides us with a theory of political economic equilibrium even when policies are multidimensional. Recall that the Downs and Wittman models only support equilibria in the
case of a unidimensional policy space5.
We now insert this concept of political equilibrium into the general model. The
mapping σ is defined as follows. Given a partition of the type space W = L ∪ R , first
define the utility functions VL and VR, as above. We now define the binary relations6 on
T x T as:
(τ 1 , τ 2 )Π L (τ 3 , τ 4 ) ⇔ V L (τ 1 ) ≥ V L (τ 3 ) and π (τ 1 , τ 2 ) ≥ π (τ 3 , τ 4 )
(τ 1 , τ 2 )Π R (τ 3 , τ 4 ) ⇔ V R (τ 1 ) ≥ V R (τ 3 ) and π (τ 1 , τ 2 ) ≥ π (τ 3 , τ 4 ) .
Thus we define
σ((L,R)) = (ΠL ,ΠR ).
With this definition, the model of PUNE is a special case of the general model.
Here, unlike in the Downs model, the preferences of the parties are responsive to party
membership, which is to say that the representation aspect of parties has been modeled.
I will conclude with a report on two applications of this model. We are given a
population with direct utility functions
u(x,y) = x − α(y − r) ,
2

5

This statement is not quite accurate. Sometimes Wittman equilibrium exists on multi-dimensional policy
spaces. For the details, consult Roemer (2001, Chapter 8.)
6
Indeed, these binary relations are incomplete, so we cannot define payoff functions. Indeed, it is their
incompleteness which is the key to securing existence of equilibrium on multi-dimensional policy spaces.
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over income, x, and the religious position of the government, y. The individual above
has an ideal religious position of r. A type is specified by an ordered pair (w,r), where w
is the income the individual of that type earns, and r is the type’s religious position. The
population is specified by a probability measure F on the set of types. For simplicity, we
assume that the value α is common to all types; it is called the salience of the religious
issue. A policy is a pair (t,Y), where t is a proportional tax rate that will redistribute
income, and Y is the religious position the party will implement, if elected.
This , then, is an example where there is one good and one principle. Our concern
is how the citizenry’s views on the principle will affect economic distribution.
If the distribution F satisfies a property that I will state momentarily, and if the
salience α is sufficiently large, then in all political equlibria of the model, both parties
will propose a tax rate of zero – that is, no redistribution – even though it may be the case
that the majority of citizens have an ideal tax rate of unity (that is, would most like
complete redistribution of income to the mean).
The condition in question is:
A.

the mean real wage of the cohort of citizens who have the median

religious view is greater than the mean real wage of the population .
If, on the other hand,
the mean real wage of the cohort of citizens who have the median religious view
is less than the mean real wage of the population ,
then, if salience is sufficiently high, all political equilibria will entail a tax rate of unity.
More generally, if A holds, then we have the following comparative statics: as the
salience α increases, the tax rate falls in equilibrium.
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What is the intuition for this effect? Suppose there is a party whose members are
predominantly the rich, while the other has members who are predominantly poor. Call
these parties Right and Left, respectively. Suppose there is a sizeable contingent of
voters who are very religious and poor. Then the Right may attract these voters by
announcing a very religious position, even if it also advocates very little redistribution: if
the salience α is high, these religious, poor voters will vote Right. Left may not respond
by compromising much on its anti-church position, if its members are predominantly
anti-clerical. It may be politically easier for Left to reduce the tax rate it proposes, in
order to attract rich voters who are anti-clerical, and who, with lower tax rates, are happy
to vote Left. If condition A holds, this effect of policy bundling can be so sharp that
both parties will propose very low tax rates in equilibrium. Thus, an issue apparently
irrelevant to distribution has massive distributive effects because of political
7

competition .
This example shows how considering political economy can radically alter our
theories of distribution. Of course, what I have called the ‘religious’ principle here could
just as well be attitudes about race, ethnicity, immigration, abortion or justice. The
views that a society has on principles, once those principles become issues upon which
political parties can (or must) take positions (i.e., policies), will in general have important
effects on the distribution of income. I, and several collaborators, are currently
computing the effect that voters’ racist and/or xenophobic preferences, in the US and/or
Europe, respectively, have on redistributive policy.
A second example (Roemer[1999 and 2001, Chapter 9]) is purely economic – that
is, there are no principles involved. The production side of the economy is as it has been
7

For the full theory, see Roemer (1998) or Roemer (2001, Chapter 10).
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in all the examples I have given: there is a single consumption good produced by a
constant-returns technology, with labor as the sole input, and individuals are endowed
with different levels of skill, or efficiency units of labor power. There is no preference
for leisure, so each citizen produces the maximum amount of good that she can in unit
time. The political issue is to choose a quadratic income -tax rule: thus, taxation need
not be linear, but can be progressive or regressive, in the sense of rising or falling
marginal tax rates. The policy space, because of a budget constraint, turns out to be two
dimensional. In political equilibrium, there is always a ‘right’ (‘left’) party, which
represents all citizens with wages greater than ( resp., less than) a certain pivot wage.
The result is, roughly speaking, that if the median wage is less than the average wage,
then in all political equilibria, both parties propose progressive tax regimes.

Thus

political competition, if the income distribution is left-skewed, induces even the Right
party to increase marginal tax rates with income.
Thus, we explain why democracies ubiquitously choose progressive taxation ,
something that cannot be adequately studied with a unidimensional space of tax policies.
There are even models where the set of policies is infinite dimensional, and
political equilibria exist. For example, generalizing from the last example, one can work
with models where the tax policy a party proposes can be any continuous function of
income. Interestingly, the political-economic equilibria we get in these models are
8

piece-wise linear tax rules, which is what we observe in most advanced democracies .

3. Conclusion

8

See Roemer (in press).
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Value and politics are intertwined because economic interests affect political
organization and competition, which in turn influence economic variables and, in
particular, distribution. But it is also the case that non-economic issues that are
important to voters affect outcomes of political competition, and therefore economic
variables. The modern problem of value, I assert, is to understand the nature of this
mutual determination.
In an elegant, recent article in the Journal of Economic Literature, Louis
Makowski and Joseph Ostroy (2001) resurrect an expression of Schumpeter’s, that
science is ‘tooled knowledge.’ We can use this terminology to describe the evolution of
political economy.

Adam Smith and David Ricardo certainly had views about how

economic interests affect political decisions, which in turn affect economic distribution,
but the knowledge was not tooled, it was semi-anecdotal. Social science has now, two
centuries or so later, developed the tools – in particular, general equilibrium theory and
game theory – that enable us to convert that knowledge into science.
In the penultimate section, I expounded an abstract model of political-economic
equilibrium, in order to demonstrate that we find ourselves at the very dawn of that
science. For the examples we have of political-economic equilibrium -- that is, specific
models deriving from that general one-- are still primitive, in the sense that they either
compress the economic side or the political side much more than we would like.

It is

difficult to derive clean conclusions, without that kind of unilateral compression – or at
least, such is the case with our present understanding. Of course, we can now learn a
good deal from simulation, and this allows us to work with models in which both the
economic and political sides are reasonably complex.

These methods have, thus far,
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barely been touched in political economy, but I expect them to come into their own in the
coming years.
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